The paper deals with a class of time-inconsistent control problems for McKean-Vlasov dynamics. By solving a backward time-inconsistent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short) equation coupled with a forward distribution-dependent stochastic differential equation, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of a closed-loop equilibrium for such time-inconsistent distribution-dependent control problem. Moreover, a special case of semi-linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics with a quadratic-type cost functional is considered due to its special structure. * Let the running cost function f 0 : [0, T ] × R d × U → R + and the terminal cost function g 0 : R d → R + be measurable. The cost functional is defined as
Introduction
Let (Ω, F, F, P) be a complete filtered probability space on which is defined an m-dimensional standard Brownian distribution {W (t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, where F = {F t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is the natural filtration augmented by all P-null sets. Denote by P 2 (R d ) the probability measure space on R d with finite second moments.
The general controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamic can be formulated as the following stochastic differential equation (SDE for short) (1.1)    dX(t) = a(t, X(t), ρ(t); u(t))dt + b(t, X(t), ρ(t); u(t))dW (t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
In (1.1), X(t) is called the state-process valued in R d and u(t) is called the control-process valued in a metric space U . In some literatures, (1.1) is also called a distribution-dependent controlled diffusion. Under some mild conditions, given u(·) in the space of admissible controls U , it can be proved that (1.1) possesses a unique solution in some appropriate space.
If the system is distribution-dependent, i.e. McKean-Vlasov dynamics, the problem becomes different. The analysis of McKean-Vlasov SDEs has a long history since the pioneering work [16, 21] and has attracted resurgent attentions in recent years thanks to the recent developments in mean-field game (MFG) problems. Compared with the classical optimal control problems for Markov processes, the counterpart for McKean-Vlasov processes becomes different because the dynamic programming principle can not be applied directly. A common approach to overcome such a difficulty is to lift the state space up into the space of probability measures. Through the Bellman principle, one can derive an HJB equation on the space of probability measures (e.g. see [26] and the references therein). Using mass transport theory, it is possible to investigate the viscosity solution of the HJB equation on the space of probability measures. See also [34] , which treats a special linear-quadratic case and obtains an optimal feedback control by analyzing a linear mean-field forward-backward SDE derived from a variational method.
An alternative idea is developed in a serial papers on MFG [20, 19, 17, 18] and [11, 12, 13, 14] where the authors considered a backward HJB equation coupled with a forward transport equation on the space of probability measures (or a forward SDE) to derive a mean-field equilibrium. Applying the similar idea to the explicit control problem of system (1.1) with cost functional (1.2), the first step is to solve a classical HJB equation which is concluded from the classical optimal control of system given a guiding (fixed) process ρ(·). At the same time, a feedback control can be determined if the HJB equation is regular enough. The second step is to verify that the guiding process ρ(·) coincides with the distribution law of the solution process of SDE (1.1) using the feedback control. If the two-step verification is fulfilled, the feedback control is called a mean-field equilibrium. One can see that the mean-field equilibrium is essentially defined by a fixed point process. Note, however, such an equilibrium is not an optimal control strategy in general.
Given a guiding process ρ(·), the HJB equation in the MFG is derived from the dynamic programming and Bellman principle if the cost function in (1.2) is exponential discounting. This is the so-called time-consistent case, i.e., the optimal control determined now stays optimal in the future. In many real life problems, such a requirement is too ideal and far from reality. For example, one must often adjust her decisions as time goes by. Mathematically, if the cost function is in non-exponential discounting or hyperbolic discounting situations, the control problem is not time-consistent anymore. For those problems, it is impossible for us to find an optimal control at the initial time which stays optimal in the future. This is the so-called time-inconsistency. The main idea is to find a local optimal control or strategy (instead of a global optimal) to save for future. Lots of works have been devoted to dealing with time-inconsistency in the last decade (e.g. see [7, 2, 4, 3, 27, 32, 33, 22, 30] ). One also may refer to the survey paper [31] and the references therein. Among those papers, two types of time-inconsistent equilibrium are considered, namely the open-loop equilibrium control and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy. For example, the openloop equilibrium control for linear-quadratic case is characterized via a maximum-principle-like methodology in [7] . To consider the closed-loop equilibrium strategy for time-inconsistent control problem, the author derived a so-called time-inconsistent HJB equation via an N -player game in [33] and verifies the local optimality in [30] .
Compared to time-consistent problems, time-inconsistency brings new interesting features as well as mathematical challenges. One of the main difficulties brought by time-inconsistency for general diffusions in R d lies in the existence of time-inconsistent equilibrium strategies. For nondegenerate stochastic diffusions in R d , the existence and uniqueness of (closed-loop) time-inconsistent equilibrium can be found in [33] . While for degenerate case, the existence is still an open problem due to the lack of first-order regularity of the viscosity solution for a degenerate second-order HJB equation. More explicitly, for a time-inconsistent problem in the space of R d , the identification of time-inconsistent equilibrium requires that the HJB equation admits a classical solution, which is not necessarily true for a degenerate problem. Thus in this paper, we will assume that the system is degenerate for general cases. For the special semi-linear-quadratic case, since the HJB has an explicit form of solutions, the non-degeneracy assumption is not necessary anymore.
In this paper, we are devoted to proving the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (see Definition 4.1) for a class of controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics with a time-inconsistent cost functional. Previous works on time-inconsistent distribution-dependent diffusions include [24, 25, 29, 34] for example. We note that the aforementioned papers are mainly focused on a special case of linear-quadratic problems. In [23] , the authors deal with time-inconsistent distribution-dependent control problems for finite-stated Markov chains. Different from the aforementioned works, in this paper we deal with a class of time-inconsistent control problems for McKean-Vlasov dynamics in R d .
The paper is arranged as follows. Some frequently used notations as well as some preliminary results will be introduced in Section 1.1. In Section 2, we will introduce our main system and prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to our system. In Section 3, we will review the main results for time-inconsistent distribution-independent control problems. In Section 4, we will present the definition of time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. In Section 5, we will consider the similar results for a class of semi-linear systems with a quadratic cost. In Section 6, we set a mean-field game whose equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium we find in our control problem. Finally some concluding remarks will be made in Section 7.
Notations and Preliminaries
Let L 2 (R d ) the collection of R d -valued random variables with a finite second moment, i.e.,
For any X ∈ L 2 (R d ), denote by law(X) the distribution of X.
Let P 2 (R d ) be the space of probability measures with finite second moments equipped with Wasserstein-2 metric w(·, ·), i.e.
It is easy to see that
We refer to [28] for more discussions on Wasserstein metrics.
Note that P δ,C 2 (R d ) is a compact subset of (P 2 (R d ), w) for any δ, C > 0. Throughout the paper, we suppose that F 0 is large enough such that for any ρ ∈ P 2 (R 2 ), there exists a ξ ∈ F 0 such that law(ξ) = ρ.
Let X := L 2 F (Ω; C([0, T ], R d )) be defined as
Let M := C([0, T ], P 2 (R d )) be the set of P 2 (R d )-valued continuous curves on [0, T ] equipped with the uniform metric m, i.e., 
By the well-known Arzela-Ascoli lemma, M δ,λ γ is a compact and convex subset of M .
For any µ ∈ M , we write
By (1.3), for any X ∈ X , law(X(t)) is continuous with respect to t under the w-metric. Thus we define a map LAW : X → M by LAW(X)(t) := law(X(t)), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
We have the following lemma.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of (1.3).
Finally let the control space U be a metric space equipped with metric d U (·, ·). Also let v 0 be some fixed point in U .
Distribution-dependent Time-inconsistent Control
On the complete probability space (Ω, F, P), we consider the following distribution-dependent controlled stochastic differential equation
dX(t) = a(t, X(t), ρ(t); u(t))dt + b(t, X(t), ρ(t))dW (t),
is the control process valued in U . From now on, we only consider the case when b is independent of u, the reason of which will be explained later.
Since we are concerned with closed-loop strategies in this paper, we write
is Lipschitz with a uniform Lipschitz constant α}.
The space of admissible closed-loop Lipschitz strategy is defined as
Under some mild conditions (e.g. Lipschitz conditions for b and σ), one can easily see that if u ∈ U , the feed back control process u(·, X(·)) ∈ L 2 F ([0, T ], U ). Thus in essence we can regard U as a subset of L 2 F ([0, T ], U ). Given the running cost f :
If we restrict u ∈ U and let X be the solution of (2.1), then the value of J and hence V depend only on the distribution of ξ. Thus we may write J(τ ; t, law(ξ); u) instead of J(τ ; t, ξ; u). Our main effort of paper is to derive a closed-loop strategy (see Definition 4.1) for such a time-inconsistent distribution-dependent problem. From now on we only consider the case u ∈ U , i.e., closed-loop strategy.
Remark 2.1. (1) One may question why the feedback control u is only a function of (t, x) (not distribution-dependent). Essentially, we incorporate the dependence on the distribution into the dependence of t.
(2) Since our strategy is in a closed-loop form which is derived from a time-inconsistent HJB equation, we assume that the diffusion coefficient b is independent of the control u to avoid the analysis on the second order regularity of the time-inconsistent HJB equation.
(3) Note that our time-inconsistent cost is distribution-independent. Let's see the following simple example. Suppose d = 1 and that the terminal cost in (2.4) is distribution dependent in the following form
Then R d g τ (x, ρ)µ(T, dx) is the product of h(τ ) and the variance of the distribution µ(T ). In this case, if we letḡ
. Thus g andḡ give the same terminal functional in V. We will see that in the process of deriving the fixed-point, the terminal conditions in the Hamilton-Jacobi equation will be different. As a consequence, the time-inconsistent equilibrium will be different as well. Therefore, to avoid such possible confusion, we will compare our problem with a time-inconsistent mean-field for infinite symmetric players. Roughly speaking, the forms of f and g are determined by the model.
Existence and Uniqueness of the Solution
In this subsection, we show that under Assumption 2.2, (2.1) admits a unique solution for any u ∈ U .
Lemma 2.3. Under Assumption 2.2, the the following assertions hold:
. As a result, by Lemma 1.1, LAW(X) ∈ M .
(2) For any u ∈ U α , there exists a constant β α independent of u such that
(3) If γ := law(ξ) has a finite (2 + δ)th moment, then for any u ∈ U α , there exist constants
where C α,γ,δ depends on α, δ and the (2 + δ)th moment of γ only and λ depends on α and the second moment of γ only.
Proof.
(1) The proof is a direct application of Picard's iteration and similar to that of Theorem 1.7 of [1] . We present the proof here for reader's convenience.
Using Itô's formula, we have
Simple calculation yields that for some positive constant M , we have
This concludes that X n is a Cauchy sequence in X with a limit written as X. Also denote µ(s) := law(X(s)) for s ∈ [0, T ]. The following verifies that X is the solution:
By virtue of (2.7), the solution X is unique and LAW(X) ∈ M .
(2) Using Itô's formula and Grownwall's inequality, the standard arguments reveal that for some constant C α > 0,
Note also that
which leads to (2.5) directly.
(3) Similarly, using Itô's formula, one can prove that for some constant D α,δ > 0, it follows that
(2.6) is a direct conclusion of (2.5) and (2.8). The proof is complete.
, where X is the distribution curve determined by (2.1) under the strategy u with initial law γ ∈ P 2 (R d ). The following lemma shows that T γ 1 depends continuously on u in some sense.
Proof. For i = 1, 2, let X i be the solution of (2.1) under strategy u i and µ i be the corresponding distribution curve. Simple calculation yields that
Grownwall's inequality implies that for some
The desired assertion (2.10) then follows from (2.5) and the definition of m in (1.4).
Time-inconsistent Distribution-independent Control
In this section, we briefly review the results on the time-inconsistent control problem in [33] . We need the following assumption.
(2) There exists a map ψ :
where β ψ is a positive constant.
The following example demonstrates that Assumption 3.1 is not hard to verify in many situations.
Simple calculation yields that
Then Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Now let's present the time-inconsistent HJB equation for time-inconsistent distribution-independent problems. The reader is referred to [33] on the derivation of such an equation via an N -player game.
We consider the following distribution-independent SDE with a priori µ ∈ M ,
with cost function
The equilibrium strategy is defined as
where Θ(τ ; t, y) is the solution to the following time-inconsistent HJB equation (given µ)
+ a t, y, µ(t); ψ(t, y, DΘ(t; t, y)) · DΘ(τ ; t, y) + f (τ ; t, y, µ(t); ψ(t, y, DΘ(t; t, y))) = 0; Θ(τ ; t, y) = g(τ ; y, µ(T )).
Here u is independent of µ due to Assumption 3.1.
Under some appropriate conditions, it is shown in [33] that there exists a unique solution of (3.6) whose first-order derivative is Lipschitz. Therefore the strategy u ∈ U is well defined by (3.5). From the previous arguments, we define a map T 2 : M → U by
where u is defined in (3.5) through solving the HJB equation (3.6) . From [22, 30] , we know that u = T 2 (µ) verifies the following local optimality condition:
Equilibrium
We are now ready to define an equilibrium for the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent problem.
In addition, u ⋆ = T 2 (µ ⋆ ) is called an equilibrium strategy.
Definition 4.1 consists of two parts. The first part requires that the distribution curve is the solution under the corresponding closed-loop strategy. The second part requires that under the a priori distribution curve, the strategy u ⋆ is a time-inconsistent strategy which has been defined in [33] and thus verifies the local-optimality in Proposition 3.3.
The following proposition can be derived directly from Definition 4.1.
(2) For any equilibrium µ ⋆ with corresponding strategy u ⋆ = T 2 (µ ⋆ ),
where Θ(τ ; s, x) is the solution of (3.6) given µ ⋆ .
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we focus on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the timeinconsistent distribution-dependent problem. Obviously, the goal is to find a fixed point for T γ
To guarantee the continuity T γ 1 • T 2 on M , we require some well-posdeness results of the timeinconsistent HJB equation (3.6) . For simplicity, we write a(t, x, ρ; p) = a(t, x, ρ; ψ(t, x, p)) and f (τ ; t, x, ρ; p) = f (τ ; t, x, ρ; ψ(t, x, p)).
Then (3.6) can be written as
+a(t, x, µ(t); DΘ(t; t, x)) · DΘ(τ ; t, x) + f (τ ; t, x, µ(t); DΘ(t; t, x)) = 0; Θ(τ ; t, x) = g(τ ; x, µ(T )).
To prove our main result, we assume the following assumption. (b) Let Θ i (τ ; t, x) be the solutions of (3.6) corresponding to µ i for i = 1, 2. There exists a constant β 3 Θ > 0 such that (1) If γ ∈ P 2 (R d ) and R d |x| 2+δ γ(dx) < ∞ for some δ > 0, there exists an equilibrium.
where β α is some appropriate constant depending only on β 1 Θ and β 2 Θ to be defined later, then there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. For any given µ ∈ M γ , write u = T 2 (µ), i.e., u(t, x) = ψ(t, x, DΘ(t; t, x)). By (4.2), we have
Then the SDE (3.2) becomes dX(t) = a(t, X(t), law(X(t)), ψ(t, X(t), DΘ(t; t, X(t))))dt + b(t, X(t), law(X(t)))dW (t)
with initial X(0) = ξ whose distribution law is γ. By Assumptions 2.2 and 3.1, similar to (2.8), there exist constants β α and β α,δ independent of µ such that
Given any µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ M γ , write u 1 = T 2 (µ 1 ) and u 2 = T 2 (µ 2 ). By (4.3) and Assumption 3.1, it follows that
. As a consequence of (2.10)
(1) If γ has a finite (2 + δ)th moment, by Lemma 2.3, LAW(X) ∈ M δ,C,λ γ for some C, λ > 0 which are independent of µ. This verifies that
Note that M δ,C,λ γ is a compact and convex set under m. In addition, thanks to (4.4), T γ 1 • T 2 is a continuous map. Consequently we can use Schauder's fixed point theorem to conclude that there exists at least a µ * which is a fixed point of T γ 1 • T 2 . Then µ * is the required equilibrium. (1) One can see that our result heavily relies on Assumption 4.3, which is not a general assumption. We will verify it under some general assumptions later.
(1) If β 3 Θ = 0, the uniqueness holds directly. A sufficient condition for this case is that a, f, g are independent of the distribution term which reduces to the time-inconsistent distributionindependent problems investigated in [33] . Thus our results generalizes the problem solved there.
Verification of Assumption 4.3
In the subsection, we present a sufficient condition for Assumption 4.3. The following is the assumption required.
Assumption 4.6. (1) b is independent of ρ and b : [0, T ] × R d is continuous with respect to t and has bounded continuous first and second order derivatives with respect to x and there exists a λ > 1 such that
To proceed, we introduce the following notations. For β ∈ (0, 1), let C β (R d ) be the space of function ϕ : R d → R such that x → ϕ(x) is continuous, and
respectively. Also let L ∞ (0, T ; C β (R d )) be the set of all measurable functions f :
Let C([0, T ]; C β (R d )) be the family of continuous functions in L ∞ (0, T ; C β (R d )). Similarly, we can define C([0, T ]; C k+β (R d )) ⊂ L ∞ (0, T ; C k+β (R d )).
Then, given any µ ∈ M , we write
x, µ(t).
One can see that if µ ∈ M , a(t, x, q) and f (τ ; t, x, q) are continuous with respect to t.
Consider the following HJB equation,
x, DΘ(t; t, x))
Lemma 4.7. Under Assumption 4.6, there exists some constant K which is independent of µ ∈ M γ such that the following assertions are true for the classical solution of (4.5):
(1) it holds true that |DΘ(t; t, 0)| + |D 2 Θ(t; t, x)| ≤ K;
(2) let Θ i (τ ; t, x) be the solution of of (4.5) corresponding to µ i , for i = 1, 2. Then
As a result, Assumption 4.3 holds.
Proof. Throughout the proof, L is a generic positive constant, independent of µ, whose exact value may change from line to line.
. Let Γ(t, x; s, y) be the fundamental solution of the heat equation
with the following representation (see [5] ),
Tedious but straightforward calculation yields that where
It is easy to check that (4.9) |θ(t, x; s, y)| + |θ y (t, x; s, y)
For reader's convenience, note that if b is independent of x, then θ = 0. This will simplify the proof a great deal. Here we are dealing with a general case when b depends on x.
(1) To prove that there exists a unique solution to (4.5), given a v, we consider the following HJB equation
One can easily see that the solution has the following representation:
x; T, y)g(τ ; y)dy
x; s, y)DΘ(τ ; s, y) · a(s, y; v(s, y))dyds
x; s, y)f τ ; s, y; v(s, y))dyds.
Note that Θ(t; t, x) is continuous with respect to t because f and g are continuous with respect to τ .
(a) First we prove that there exists a constant K 1 independent of v such that
Note that 
Using Assumption 4.6, it can be seen that from (4.11) that
Using Grownwall's inequality, we have
where K is a constant independent of µ and v.
(b) Let Θ i be the solution of (4.10) under v i . We need to prove that for some K 2 > 0 (4.13) sup
Note that
x; s, y)DΘ 1 (τ ; s, y) · a(s, y; v 1 (s, y))dy
x; s, y)DΘ 2 (τ ; s, y) · a(s, y; v 2 (s, y))dy ds
This concludes (4.13).
From (4.11), we know Θ(τ, t, ·) ∈ C 1 (R d ). Define a map Ψ :
is the solution of (4.10) using DΘ. By (4.12) and (4.13), we know that Ψ is a contraction if δ is small. Thus there exists a unique solution Θ for (4.5) on [T − δ, T ]. Since the constant K is independent of δ, for time interval [0, T ]. One can divide the time horizon [0, T ] into several small intervals, and then prove that the solution exists on whole time interval [0, T ] recursively.
(2) By (4.12), it is easy to see that DΘ(τ, s, ·) L ∞ ≤ K.
Now we verify that
Use the fundamental solution method again, writing v = DΘ,
x; s, y)DΘ n+1 (τ, s, y) · a(s, y, ρ(s); v(s, y))dyds
x; s, y)f τ ; s, y; v(s, y) dyds.
it follows that (4.16)
x; s, y) + Γ x j (t, x; s, y)θ i (t, x, s, y)
x; s, y)g y j (τ, y)dy
x; s, y) + Γ(t, x; s, y)θ j (t, x; s, y) θ i (t, x, s, y)g y j (τ, y)dy
Note that Recall v = DΘ, plugging (4.16)-(4.18) into (4.15), and noting (4.12), it follows that
Gronwall's inequality then implies that (4.14) holds.
(3) Now let's verify (4.6) . Let Θ i be the solutions of (4.5) using µ i for i = 1, 2. By (4.11) and (4.12),
By Grownwall's inequality, we have
The proof is complete.
Semi-linear Distribution-dependent Case
In this section, we deal with a special case of semi-linear distribution-dependent diffusions with a quadratic cost. In such a case, the solution to the HJB equation can be presented as a Riccati equation which simplifies the verification process a lot. By such an explicit representation, the system is not required to be non-degenerate and therefore W (·) is assumed to be 1-dimensional Brownian motion for convenience. Moreover, to simplify the form of the Riccati equation, we assume the diffusion coefficient depends on the distribution term and the time variable t only, not on the state variable x.
In this section, S d is the set of d × d symmetric matrices equipped with following metric
Next Consider the following d-dimensional distribution-dependent controlled SDE
The admissible strategy is defined as in (2.3). Let
The time-inconsistent cost functional is defined as
f (τ ; t, X(t); u(t, X(t)) + F (τ ; t, law(X(t)))dt + g(τ ; X(T )) + H(τ ; law(X(T )) ,
We need the following assumption in this section.
(2) A(·), B(·) are bounded continuous deterministic functions on [0, T ].
(3) Q(τ ; ·), R(τ ; ·) are uniformly bounded continuous S-valued deterministic processes on [0, T ] with Q(τ ; t), R(t; t) ≥ ε −1 0 I l for some ε 0 > 0.
(4) G(τ ) ≥ 0.
Linear Distribution-independent Diffusion
Given a(·), b(·), F(τ, ·) ∈ C([0, T ], R d ) and H(τ ) ∈ R, consider the following d-dimensional controlled SDE with W (·) being a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion, Since it is linear-quadratic case now, solving (3.6) using the appropriate coefficients, one can conclude that the time-inconsistent equilibrium is
where P (τ ; ·) ∈ R d×d , q(τ ; ·) ∈ R d , η(τ ; ·) ∈ R satisfy (we omit the dependence on u in J and V now) J(τ ; t, x) = P (τ ; t)x, x + 2 p(τ ; t), x + η(τ ; t) and V (t, x) = J(t; t, x), and (P, p, η) satisfies the following Riccati equations (if there exists a solution)
+P (t; t)B(t)R −1 (t; t)R(τ ; t)R −1 (t; t)B ′ (t)P (t; t) = 0, p(τ ; T ) = 0; and (5.9)
Here we note that u is depending on µ which doesn't meet Assumption 3.1. While due to the linear structure, it is still possible for us to deal with such a special case.
Based on the representations, we have the following proposition. (2) There exists a positive constant K P (depending on P ) such that |DV (t, 0)| = 2|p(t; t)| ≤ K P T (1 + a(·) L ∞ ).
(3) Let V i (t, x) be the solutions corresponding to (a i (·), b i (·)), i = 1, 2. Then
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that (5.7) admits a unique solution. If a and b are bounded and γ has finite (2 + δ)th moment for some δ > 0, then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. Let X be the solution of (5.4) with a(t) = a(t, µ(t)), b(t) = b(t, µ(t)) Since a and b are bounded, Itô's formula concludes that
where (P i , p i , η i ) is the solution of (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9) with (a i , b i , F i , H i ). By the definitions of a and b in (5.11), Assumption 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 yields the following estimates
By virtue of the proof for Theorem 4.4, there exists an equilibrium.
Remark 5.4. (1) In [33] , the author presented a sufficient condition in the examples for the existence of a solution to (5.7).
(2) The assumption that a and b are bounded is not very general because it didn't even cover the case a(t, ρ) = R d xρ(dx).
The reason for such assumption is to guarantee that the first inequality in (5.12) holds such that (5.10) is true.
(3) It is not hard to see if T is small, (5.7) has a unique solution and (5.12) holds. Thus our results are always true for small time horizon.
Strong Dissipative Case
In this section, we will raise a strong dissipativity condition such that The following is the assumption we use.
Assumption 5.5. Let λ max (t) be the largest real part of the eigenvalues of A(t). Assume that for some L 0 > 0, sup 0≤t≤T λ max (t) ≤ −L 0 .
Lemma 5.6. Under Assumption 5.5, if L 0 > 0 is large, (5.7) exists a unique solution. Moreover, the solution P (τ ; t) is uniformly bounded by a constant which is independent of L 0 . As a result, the constant K P in Proposition 5.2 is independent of L 0 .
Proof. We adopt the fixed-point theory here. Given v i (t) = P i (t; t) (resp.v i (t) =P i (t; t)), let P i+1 (τ ; t) (resp.P i+1 (τ ; t)) be the solution of (5.13)
Let A(t) be the solution of d dt A(t) = A(t) and A(T ) = 0.
Therefore one can conclude that
C([t,T ];S)
T t e −L 0 (s−t) ds I d
T ];S) ) I d By Assumption 5.5, there exist uniform constants K 0 , K 1 (independent of L 0 ),
If L 0 is large such that L 0 ≥ 4K 2 0 K 1 and v 0 (·) C([0,T ];S) is small, we can conclude that (5.15 )
Note that the constant on the right-hand side is independent of L 0 .
By (5.13) , simple calculation yields that
Using the uniform bound in (5.15), we can conclude that
Thus if δ is small, there exists a unique solution of (5. Proof. Throughout the proof, L is a generic constant varying from place to place but independent of L 0 . Let µ 1 (t) = γ and u 1 (t, x) = −R(t; t) −1 B ′ (t)[P (t; t)x + p 1 (t; t)], where p 1 (·; ·) is the solution of (5.8) using a(t) = a(t, µ 1 (t)). Then let µ 2 be distribution curve of the solution X 2 of (5.1) using strategy u 1 . Recursively repeating such processes, we can get a sequence of {µ n : µ n (0) = γ}. Note that in the 2-step recursion method, u i (t, x) = −R(t; t) −1 B(t) ′ [P (t; t)x + p i−1 (t; t)].
By Assumption 5.1, using Ito's formula, we have If L 0 > 0 is large, we can see that (5.16 ) sup 0≤t≤T E|X i (t)| 2 ≤ L(1 + E|ξ| 2 ).
where we use the following |b(t, µ 1 (t)) − b(t, µ 2 (t))| 2 ≤ Lw 2 (ρ 1 (t), ρ 2 (t)) ≤ LE|X 1 (t) − X 2 (t)| 2 .
Grownwall's inequality implies
If L 0 is large, by Lemma 1.1, µ n is a Cauchy sequence in M γ and its limit is the unique equilibrium.
Mean-field Game
In this section, we compare our results with a mean-field game for infinite-many symmetric players. We use the same notations from the previous sections.
For i = 1, · · · , N , the dynamic for ith player is (6.1) dX i (t) = a(t, X i (t), µ −i N (t), u i (t))dt + b(t, X i (t), µ −i N (t))dW i (t) where µ −i N (t, dx) = 1 N −1 j =i δ X j (t) (dx). The ith player makes his decision based the following time-inconsistent cost functional and X(s) is the solution of (6.1) with initial x.
Since the cost functional is time-inconsistent, the players shall look for a local optimal strategy instead of a global one. Since all the players are symmetric, we would suppose that every player should obey the same strategy. Letting N → ∞, by the law of large numbers, we can define the equilibrium and the corresponding (closed-loop) equilibrium strategy as following. Definition 6.1. µ ⋆ ∈ M γ is called an equilibrium and u ⋆ : [0, T ] × R d → U is called a (closedloop) equilibrium strategy if (1) µ ⋆ is the distribution curve of the following SDE, dY (t) = a(t, Y (t), µ ⋆ (t), u ⋆ (t, Y (t))))dt + b(t, Y (t), µ ⋆ (t))dW (t), law(Y (0)) = γ.
(2) the following local optimality holds, lim sup ε→0 + J(t; t, x, µ ⋆ ; u ⋆ ) − J(t; t, x, µ ⋆ ; u ε ⊕ u ⋆ | [t+ε,T ]) ε ≤ 0 for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R d and u ε ∈ L 2 F ([t, t + ε), U ).
By Proposition 3.3, the equilibrium defined in Definition 4.1 is same as the equilibrium for such a mean-field game with infinite-many symmetric players. Since f and g here can be fully determined by the mean-field game, such equivalence also illustrates the confusion (3) mentioned in Remark 2.1.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proved the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for general time-inconsistent McKean-Vlasov dynamics and a special semi-linear case under some appropriate assumptions. The results generalized the results in [33] for McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Moreover, the equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium for a mean-field game of infinite-many symmetric players with a time-inconsistent cost.
